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I. INTRODUCTION
URING the Survey period, Texas courts tended to strictly inter-
pret the provisions of the Family Code in addressing a number of
issues. Although this sometimes led to harsh results, particularly
in cases involving the appeal of an order terminating parental rights, it
provided slightly more certainty in this practice area. Yet, as a number of
* Chief Justice, Fifth District Court of Appeals at Dallas. Chief Justice Thomas re-
ceived her B.A. from the University of Texas at Arlington and her J.D. from Southern
Methodist University.
** Solo Attorney, Fifth District Court of Appeals at Dallas. Ms. Vick received her
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the cases discussed below demonstrate, any greater predictability pro-
vided by the courts came at a price. It is clearly imperative for a party to
consider, and meet, all statutory deadlines and requirements in order to
avoid the possible loss of a claim or argument.
II. GRANDPARENT'S ACCESS
A. STATUTORY PRESUMPTION
During the 2005 session, the Texas Legislature amended the grandpar-
ent access statute, in light of the plurality opinion of four justices of the
United States Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville,1 to add a presump-
tion that a parent acts in the best interest of the child.2 For a grandparent
to be awarded access to or possession of a child, the grandparent, in addi-
tion to the other statutory requirements, must now overcome this pre-
sumption by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that denial of
possession of, or access to, the child would significantly impair the child's
physical health or emotional well-being.3 In In re Derzapf,4 the Texas
Supreme Court considered whether a grandmother overcame the pre-
sumption and established her right of access to the children.
In Derzapf, the grandmother and step-grandfather (collectively, the
"grandparents") provided the majority of the children's care during the
summer months following the death of the children's mother. When the
school year began, the father attempted to reassert himself as the chil-
dren's primary caregiver. The grandparents resisted the transition and
ultimately filed a suit affecting the parent-child relationship ("SAPCR")
seeking both custody of the children and to be named sole managing con-
servators of the children. The trial court dismissed the SAPCR, finding
the grandparents did not have standing to be named sole managing con-
servators or joint managing conservators of the children because "there
was no evidence that [the father's] care of the children created 'serious
question[s] concerning [their] physical health or welfare' as Family Code
section 102.004(a) required."'5
Following the SAPCR, the father refused the grandparents any access
to the children. The grandparents then filed a petition for access under
section 153.433. The trial court granted the petition and awarded visita-
tion with the children during part of Thanksgiving Day and on the first
Saturday of each month.6 The father sought relief through a petition for
writ of mandamus.
The supreme court first considered whether the step-grandfather had
standing to seek grandparent access. Only a biological or adoptive grand-
parent has standing to file a suit seeking access to or possession of a
1. 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
2. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
3. § 153.433(2).
4. 219 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
5. Id. at 329.
6. Id. at 331.
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grandchild under chapter 153 of the family code and, therefore, the step-
grandfather did not have standing under the statute.7 Because the trial
court awarded access based on section 153.433, the court declined to sub-
stantively address the step-grandfather's arguments he had standing
under section 102.0038 of the family code or that he had a justiciable in-
terest sufficient to confer standing. Finding the step-grandfather had
standing on these other grounds would override the statutory require-
ments established by the Legislature in section 153.432. 9
The court then turned to whether the trial court abused its discretion
by awarding the grandmother access to the children. Section 153.433 re-
quires a grandparent to overcome the statutory presumption that a par-
ent acts in the child's best interest.' 0 "A trial court abuses its discretion
when it grants access to a grandparent who has not met [the statutory]
standard because '[a] trial court has no "discretion" in determining what
the law is or applying the law to the facts[,]' even when the law is
unsettled."" a
In order to overcome the statutory presumption, the grandmother was
required to prove the denial of access to her in particular would signifi-
cantly impair the children's physical health or emotional well-being.1 2
The psychologist appointed by the trial court to evaluate the parties testi-
fied it was in the best interest of the children to have contact with their
mother's family. However, the psychologist's opinion was based on the
family as a whole, including the step-grandfather and three uncles-spe-
cifically on the strengths of the step-grandfather. 13 The psychologist also
noted the grandmother's resistance to transitioning the children to the
father's full-time care "interfered with the children's emotional and be-
havioral adjustment."'1 4 Further, the grandmother actively attempted to
alienate one of the children from the father.
A grandparent has a "high threshold" to overcome the presumption
that a fit parent acts in his children's best interest, and the trial court may
not interfere with a fit parent's decisions "simply because a 'better deci-
sion' may have been made."'1 5 The court concluded the evidence did not
support awarding the grandmother access over the father's objection.16
Turning to the father's request for mandamus relief, the court deter-
mined the trial court's order "divest[ed] a fit parent of possession of his
7. Id. at 331-32 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.432 (Vernon Supp. 2007)).
8. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (providing standing to
file SAPCR to person who had care, control, and possession of the child for at least six
months ending not more than ninety days before suit filed).
9. Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d at 333-34. However, this conclusion does not mean "grand-
parents may not seek conservatorship by satisfying chapter 102's standing requirements."
Id. at 333 n.10 (emphasis in original).
10. Id. at 333.
11. Id. (citations omitted).
12. Id. at 333 (emphasis in original) (citing § 153.433(2)).
13. Id. at 334.
14. Id.




children, in violation of Troxel's cardinal principle and without overcom-
ing the statutory presumption that the father is acting in his children's
best interest."'1 7 Because the divesture was irremediable, the father was
entitled to mandamus relief.
18
B. APPLICATION OF PRESUMPTION
Two courts of appeals, however, have limited the application of the
statutory presumption outside an original suit for grandparent access. In
In re M.A.S., 19 the trial court issued a custody order naming the mother
and father of the children joint managing conservators and naming the
maternal grandmother a possessory conservator. Almost two years later,
the mother filed a motion to modify, requesting the trial court terminate
the grandmother's access to the children. The trial court granted the
motion.
On appeal, the grandmother asserted the trial court erred in applying
the section 153.433 presumption that a parent acts in a child's best inter-
est in a modification proceeding. Relying on In re V.L.K.,20 the San
Antonio Court of Appeals agreed with the grandmother.21
V.L.K. involved the statutory presumption in section 153.131 of the
Family Code that it is in the child's best interest for custody to be
awarded to the parent.22 Chapter 153 of the Family Code governs origi-
nal custody determinations while chapter 156 governs modifications.2
3
Because chapter 156 did not include the same presumption as chapter
153, the presumption applied only in original custody determinations and
not in modification suits. 24
In M.A.S., the San Antonio Court of Appeals determined the parental
presumption for grandparent access is also contained in chapter 153 and,
therefore, is applicable only in original custody determinations. 25 Ac-
cordingly, the trial court erred in applying the presumption in granting
the mother's motion to modify.26 Rather, the mother was required under
section 156.101 of the Family Code to prove the modification was in the
children's best interest and the circumstances of at least one of the parties
affected by the order had materially and substantially changed since the
order took affect.2 7
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals considered a similar issue in
17. Id. at 335.
18. Id.
19. No. 04-06-00629-CV, 2007 WL 2608552 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Sept. 12, 2007,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
20. 24 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. 2000).
21. M.A.S., 2007 WL 2608552, at *1.




25. M.A.S., 2007 WL 2608552, at *1.
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.101 (Vernon Supp. 2007)).
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Banta v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services.28 There, the
grandfather sought access to the child in a termination proceeding. The
child had been living with his mother and grandfather. The Texas De-
partment of Family and Protective Services (the "Department") removed
the child from the home and sought to terminate both parents' parental
rights. The grandfather intervened, seeking managing conservatorship of
the child, and later filed a supplemental petition requesting grandparent
access. 29 The trial court denied the request.
On appeal, the grandfather contended the parental presumption does
not apply following the termination of parental rights. The court agreed
the presumption was inapplicable because neither parent "could be pre-
sumed 'fit' at the time the trial court considered [the grandfather's] re-
quest."' 30 However, access under section 153.433 is "subject to the trial
court's determination of the best interest of the child. '3 1 Because the
evidence did not establish that giving the grandfather access to the child
was in the child's best interest, the trial court did not err in denying the
grandfather's request.32
III. PATERNITY
The San Antonio Court of Appeals determined in In re H.C.S. 33 that a
sperm donor does not have standing to bring a proceeding to adjudicate
the parentage of a child conceived using the donor's sperm. In H.C.S.,
the sperm donor's sister was in a same-sex relationship with a woman
who wanted to have a child. The brother agreed to provide sperm to
artificially inseminate his sister's partner. Approximately five years after
the child was born, the two women's relationship ended.
The brother brought suit to adjudicate the parentage of the child, con-
tending he and the mother had verbally agreed he would be involved in
the child's life. The mother filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing a
sperm donor is precluded from filing suit to adjudicate parental rights
because he was not a parent of the child.34
The brother contended section 160.602 of the family code allows a
"man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated" to maintain a suit
to adjudicate parentage. 35 In support of his argument, the brother relied
on In re Sullivan36 in which the Houston Fourteenth District Court of
28. No. 13-06-00548-CV, 2007 WL 2128901 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi July 26, 2007,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
29. At trial, the grandfather abandoned his request to be named managing conserva-
tor. Id. at *2.
30. Id. at *3.
31. Id. at *2 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002 (Vernon 2002)).
32. Id. at *4-5.
33. 219 S.W.3d 33 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.).
34. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702 (Vernon 2002) ("A donor is not a parent of a
child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.").
35. H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d at 35; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.602 (Vernon Supp. 2008).




Appeals determined section 160.602 conferred "standing on a man alleg-
ing himself to be the biological father of the child in question and seeking
an adjudication that he is the father of the child." The Houston court
concluded the "issue of the man's status as a donor under section 160.702
is to be decided at the merits stage of the litigation rather than as part of
the threshold issue of standing. 37
The San Antonio Court of Appeals noted section 102.003 of the Family
Code, the general standing provision for SAPCRs, allows "a man alleging
himself to be the father of a child filing in accordance with [c]hapter 160,
subject to the limitations of that chapter, but not otherwise" to file a
SAPCR.38 However, a "male donor" is specifically excluded as an al-
leged father.39 Chapter 160 defines a "donor" as "an individual who pro-
duces . . . sperm used for assisted reproduction .... "40 Accordingly, the
brother was not an "alleged father" for purposes of section 102.003.41
Further, standing under section 102.003 is subject to other provisions of
the Family Code, including those allowing a "male donor to effectively
become the parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction
if he and the mother of the child 'sign [and file] an acknowledgment of
paternity with the intent to establish the man's paternity." 42 The brother
failed to follow these procedures and could not "now circumvent the
statutory plan for establishing paternity in assisted reproduction cases."
43
"[B]ased on the plain language of the Family Code," the San Antonio
Court of Appeals concluded the brother "as an unmarried man who pro-
vided sperm used for assisted reproduction and who did not sign and file
an acknowledgment of paternity, does not have standing to pursue a suit
to determine paternity of the child born through the assisted reproduc-
tion."'44 In doing so, the court disagreed with the Houston court's "con-
clusion [in Sullivan] that status as a donor is irrelevant to the question of
standing to establish parentage. ' 45 The San Antonio court also disagreed
that donor status should be decided during the merits stage of the
litigation.46
The Texas Legislature addressed this issue during the 2007 legislative
session. The Family Code now provides an unmarried man is the father
of a child if, with the intent to be the father of the resulting child, the man
provides sperm to a licensed physician to be used for assisted reproduc-
37. Id.
38. H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d at 36 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(8) (Vernon
Supp. 2007)).
39. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.0015(b)(3) (Vernon 2002)).
40. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.102(6) (Vernon Supp. 2007)).
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.301, 160.305) (Vernon 2002 & Supp.
2007)).
43. Id. at 36-37.
44. Id. at 36.




tion by an unmarried woman.47 The man's consent to be the father of the
child must be in a record signed by the man and the unmarried woman
and kept by a licensed physician. 48
IV. ADOPTION
The Austin and Houston First District Courts of Appeals considered
the issue of adoption of a child by same sex couples. The facts in Good-
son v. Castellanos49 and Hobbs v. Van Stavern5° are very similar. In each
case, one of the women in a same sex relationship was the mother of the
child-in Goodson by adoption and in Hobbs by birth. The other woman
in each relationship adopted the child with the mother's consent. After
the relationship ended, the former partner who adopted the child filed a
SAPCR seeking joint managing conservatorship of the child. Both
mothers challenged their former partner's standing to bring the SAPCR,
contending Texas law does not allow two individuals of the same sex to
adopt a child, and therefore, the adoption decrees were void.
A parent has standing to bring an original SAPCR.51 The mothers
both argued the term "parent" is defined by the Family Code to be "the
mother of the child or a man who has been adjudicated to be the father of
the child" and, therefore, the former partner was not a "parent" and did
not have standing to bring a SAPCR.52 Both courts of appeals rejected
this argument, noting section 101.024(a) of the Family Code expressly
provides that an adoptive parent is a parent. 53 The Austin court also
found standing based on the former partner's actual care, control, and
possession of the child for at least six months ending not more than
ninety days preceding the filing of the petition.54
In both cases, the mothers argued the former partner lacked standing
because the adoption orders were void under Texas law. Relying on sec-
tion 162.001 of the Family Code, the mothers argued that, under the cir-
cumstances, only a stepparent or former stepparent could have adopted
each child.55 Because their former partners were neither, they were not
47. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.7031(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
48. § 160.7031(b).
49. 214 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, pet. denied).
50. 249 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
51. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
52. Hobbs, 249 S.W.3d at 3-4; Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 742.
53. Hobbs, 249 s.W.3d at 4; Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 752.
54. Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 752-53 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9)
(Vernon Supp. 2008)).
55. Hobbs, 214 S.W.3d at 4; Goodson, 249 S.W.3d at 747. At the time of the adop-
tions, section 162.001, in relevant part, allowed for the adoption of a child if the par-
ent-child relationship had been terminated with respect to at least one parent, the other
parent consented to the adoption, and the person seeking to adopt the child was (1) a
stepparent or (2) a former stepparent who had been a managing conservator or had actual
care, possession, and control of the child for a period of six months preceding the adoption.
Act of May 16, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 562, § 14, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1983, 1991(amended 2003) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.001 (Vernon Supp.
2008)). In 2003, the legislature amended section 162.001 to make it optional that the per-
son seeking to adopt be the child's former stepparent.
2008]
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eligible to adopt the child.
The Austin Court of Appeals concluded the adoption decree was not
void. 56 Rather, the district court is a court of general jurisdiction under
the Texas Constitution and is specifically authorized by the Family Code
to issue adoption orders. 57 Even assuming the district court erred in issu-
ing the adoption decree, the "error was based on an erroneous construc-
tion of statutes, and the judgment would be based on an erroneous
holding of substantive law."' 58 However, these errors would neither de-
prive the district court of jurisdiction over the adoption nor render the
decree void.59
Both courts of appeals agreed with the former partners' argument that
the mothers failed to timely attack the adoption. Section 162.012 of the
Family Code "prohibits all challenges to an adoption decree if they are
filed more than six months after an adoption order is signed."' 60 The leg-
islature included no exceptions in section 162.012-"not for challenges to
purportedly void adoption orders, not for good cause, and not for public
policy reasons."'61 Because more than six months had passed since the
adoptions, section 162.012 precluded the mothers from attacking the
decrees. 62
Both mothers also argued the adoption of a child by two people of the
same sex violated the public policy of the state and-Goodson argued-
was fundamental error. The Houston court made short work of this argu-
ment, noting the Family Code allowed an adoptive parent to seek joint
managing conservatorship.63 The Austin court first declined the invita-
tion to apply the fundamental error doctrine "in this area of the law."
64
It then addressed the mother's public policy arguments in a somewhat
stronger tone than the Houston court, concluding:
there is no direct statement of public policy found in the family code
or the constitution prohibiting the adoption of a child by two individ-
uals of the same sex. Accordingly, any concern with the propriety of
this adoption must yield to the directly stated public policy of this
State prohibiting a direct or collateral attack on a judgment more
than six months after an adoption is ordered and providing children
with a stable home environment.
65
Both courts of appeals affirmed the trial courts' judgments regarding
conservatorship.
56. Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 747.
57. Id. at 747-48 (citing TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8 and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.016
(Vernon Supp. 2007)).
58. Id. at 748.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 748-49; see Hobbs, 249 s.W.3d at 4 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.012
(Vernon 2002)).
61. Hobbs, 249 S.W.3d at 4; see Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 749.
62. Hobbs, 249 S.W.3d at 4; Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 749.
63. Hobbs, 249 S.W.3d at 5.
64. Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 750.




A. APPEAL OF TERMINATION
Section 263.405 of the Family Code provides for an accelerated appeal
of a final order in cases where the Department has assumed the care of
the child.66 Within fifteen days of the trial court signing the final order,
the party must file with the trial court either a statement of the points the
party intends to appeal or a statement of points combined with a motion
for new trial.67 The notice of appeal must be filed within twenty days of
the trial court entering the final order.68 Within thirty days of signing the
final order, the trial court must hold a hearing to determine whether a
new trial should be granted, whether any claim of indigency should be
sustained, and whether the appeal is frivolous as provided by section
13.003(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.69 The appellate re-
cord must be filed within sixty days after the final order is entered, and
the appellate court is required to "render its final order or judgment with
the least possible delay."'70
1. Statement of Points
During the 2005 legislative session, the Legislature enacted section
263.405(i) of the Family Code mandating that, for any appeal filed after
September 1, 2005, the appellate court could not "consider any issue that
was not specifically presented to the trial court in a timely filed statement
of points on which the party intends to appeal or in a statement combined
with a motion for new trial. '71 All fourteen appellate courts have com-
plied with the Legislature's directive by concluding any issues not
presented to the trial court in a statement of points or in a statement of
points combined with a motion for new trial are not preserved and may
not be considered on appeal. 72 Further, a trial court may not grant an
66. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
67. § 263.405(d).
68. § 263.405(c); TEX. R. App. PROC. 26.1(b).
69. § 263.405(d).
70. § 263.405(a), (f).
71. § 263.405(i). However, a statement of points is not required in the appeal of a
private termination action in which the children were never under the Department's care.
In re J.R.S., 232 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).
72. In re R.M., No. 04-07-00048-CV, 2007 WL 1988149, at *2 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio July 11, 2007, pet. denied); In re M.N., 230 S.W.3d 248, 249 (Tex. App.-Eastland
2007, pet. filed); In re R.C., 243 S.W.3d 674, 675-76 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2007, no pet.); In
re R.J.S., 219 S.W.3d 623, 627 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied); In re R.M.R., 218
S.W.3d 863, 864 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2007, no pet.); Adams v. Tex. Dep't of Family
& Protective Servs., 236 S.W.3d 271, 278 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); In
re J.F.R., No. 09-06-00115-CV, 2007 WL 685640, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Feb. 8,
2007, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re J.H., No. 12-06-00002-CV, 2007 WL 172105, at *1 (Tex.
App.-Tyler Jan. 24, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re A.H.L., Ill., 214 S.W.3d 45, 53 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 2006, pet. denied); In re C.M., 208 S.W.3d 89, 91-92 (Tex. App.-Houston[14th Dist.] 2006, no pet); In re D.A.R., 201 S.W.3d 229, 230 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006,
no pet.); Coey v. -Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-05-00679-CV, 2006 WL
1358490, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Austin May 19, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re E.A.R. 201
S.W.3d 813, 814 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, no pet.); In re J.M.S., No. 06-05-00139-CV, 2005
2008]
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extension of time in which to file the statement of points. 73
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In Texas, there is a statutory right to counsel for indigent persons in
cases brought by the State to terminate parental rights.7 4 This right em-
bodies the right to effective counsel.75 To establish ineffective assistance
of counsel, the appellant must prove that counsel's assistance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient assistance
prejudiced the appellant. 76 The record must affirmatively demonstrate
the alleged ineffectiveness. 77
The appellate courts have struggled with ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claims in a parental rights termination case due to the stringent appel-
late timeline in section 263.405(i). In Doe v. Brazoria County Child
Protective Services,78 the trial court terminated the mother's parental
rights on September 15, 2005. On October 12, 2005, the mother's trial
counsel filed a notice of appeal. The trial court appointed appellate coun-
sel on October 13, 2005. On November 8, 2005, the mother filed a mo-
tion with the appellate court to extend the time to file notice of appeal.
Ten days later, the mother filed a motion for new trial and a motion to
abate with the appellate court. The motion to abate contained a copy of
the motion for new trial and a statement of points on appeal.
The Houston First District Court of Appeals abated the case and re-
manded it to the trial court for a hearing on the issue of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. At the hearing, the mother's trial counsel testified, in
relevant part, that he did not timely file the notice of appeal because he
did not know the appeal was accelerated until more than fifteen days
after the judgment. He admitted he did not file a motion for new trial on
the mother's behalf and did not know he failed to preserve the mother's
legal and factual insufficiency issues by failing to file one. He also did not
know the mother waived points on appeal by not filing a statement of
points. The trial court found the mother's counsel was ineffective post-
judgment. 79
Brazoria County Child Protective Services filed a motion to dismiss,
contending the appellate court did not have jurisdiction over the appeal
because the mother's notice of appeal and motion to extend time to file
notice of appeal were both untimely. A notice of appeal in a termination
WL 3465518, at *1 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Dec. 19, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.). However,
outside the Survey period both the Fort Worth and Texas Courts of Appeals found this
unconstitutional In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d 625, 648 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. de-
nied) (en banc); In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 894 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. de-
nied) (as applied).
73. M.N., 230 S.W.3d at 249.
74. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
75. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003).
76. Id. at 545 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
77. In re J.W., 113 S.W.3d 605, 616 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
78. 226 S.W.3d 563 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)
79. Id. at 570.
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case must be filed within twenty days after the judgment is signed.80
However, the appellate court may extend the time to file a notice of ap-
peal if, within fifteen days after the deadline for filing the notice of ap-
peal, the party files the notice of appeal and a motion complying with
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 10.5(b). 81 A motion to extend time to
file notice of appeal is implied when an appellant, acting in good faith,
files a notice of appeal "within the fifteen day period in which [the] appel-
lant would be entitled to move to extend the filing deadline. '82
In Doe, the mother's notice of appeal was due by October 5, 2005. She
filed her notice of appeal on October 12, 2005, which was within the fif-
teen-day grace period. Therefore, a motion to extend time was necessa-
rily implied.83 The testimony of the mother's trial counsel that he did not
know the appeal was accelerated until more than fifteen days after judg-
ment was a "plausible statement that the failure to timely file the notice
of appeal was the result of mistake."' 84 Accordingly, the mother's notice
of appeal was timely.85
Among other claims, the mother argued on appeal that her trial coun-
sel was ineffective by failing to file a statement of points on appeal,
thereby precluding her from raising any issues on appeal. The Houston
court disagreed, noting it had considered the mother's "ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim because she can raise it for the first time on appeal
without preserving it in the trial court. '86 Further, within the context of
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court considered the
mother's factual insufficiency points.8 7 Therefore, the mother was unable
to show trial counsel's failure to file a statement of points prejudiced
80. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(a) (Vernon 2002); TEX. R. App. P. 26.1(b).
81. Doe, 226 S.W.3d at 570.
82. Id. at 570-71 (citing Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997)).
83. Id. at 571.
84. Id. Although it is not clear from the opinion, it appears the appellate court relied
on trial counsel's testimony during the ineffective assistance of counsel hearing to provide
the reasonable explanation for filing the notice of appeal late. Rule 10.5(b) requires the
"facts relied upon to reasonably explain the need for an extension" to be included in the
motion to extend. TEX. R. App. P. 10.5(b). A careful practitioner should not rely on testi-
mony taken after filing the motion to extend to supply the reasonable explanation.
85. Doe, 226 S.W.3d at 571.
86. Id. at 576. Approximately six weeks after issuing Doe, the Houston First District
Court of Appeals issued a substituted opinion in Pool v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective
Servs., 227 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) following the father
filing a motion for rehearing. The court denied the motion for rehearing and concluded
that section 263.405(i) precluded it from considering the father's issues on appeal because
he failed to file a statement of points. The father argued this result prevented him from
asserting his "right to appeal the judgment of the trial court terminating his parental
rights." Id. at 216. He noted that his appellate counsel was not appointed until after the
deadline for filing a statement of points had passed and that his trial counsel failed to file
the statement of points. Id. The court of appeals summarily rejected the argument be-
cause the father did not assert that his trial counsel "effectively abandoned him after the
trial court signed its judgment" or "provided ineffective assistance in not filing a statement
of points or a new trial motion." Id. Therefore, in order to obtain the relief given in Doe,
the appellant must file the proper motions and clearly present his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.




As an additional note, in In re D.H.,89 the Houston Fourteenth District
Court of Appeals denied a mother's request to abate the appeal and re-
mand the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the
mother's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court of appeals
noted the mother cited no authority for the contention she was entitled to
the relief sought and addressed the claim under a traditional ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel review without an evidentiary hearing on the
mother's claims. 90
The Beaumont Court of Appeals disagreed with Doe in In re J.FR.,91
noting the Doe court failed to "analyze section 263.405(i)'s impact on in-
effective assistance claims" and relied on In re J.M.S.,92 "a case decided
before section 263.405(i) became effective," in determining an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim could be made for the first time on appeal.
93
Because "the constitutional dimension of the parent-child relationship
does not automatically override the procedural requirements for error
preservation," the Beaumont court concluded an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim must be preserved in a statement of points before it can be
considered on appeal. 94 The Tyler, 95 Corpus Christi,96 El Paso, 97 Fort
Worth, 98 and San Antonio99 courts have also determined an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim must be preserved in a timely filed statement
of points.
3. Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence
In In re A.S., 100 the trial court terminated both parents' parental rights.
The parents filed a motion for new trial and statement of points, attacking
each of the grounds for termination based on legal and factual sufficiency.
The trial court found the father was indigent, but an appeal would be
frivolous. On appeal, the father argued due process required the prepa-
ration of a reporter's record of the termination trial so the Beaumont
Court of Appeals could review the finding that an appeal would be frivo-
lous. The court of appeals framed the issue as "whether limiting the
88. Id. at 576.
89. No. 14-06-00187-CV, 2007 WL 2447273 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 30,
2007, no pet.) (mer. op.).
90. Id. at *2.
91. No. 09-06-00115-CV, 2007 WL 685640, at *2 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Feb. 8, 2007,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
92. 43 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
93. J.F.R., 2007 WL 685640, at *2.
94. Id.
95. In re J.H., No. 12-06-00002-CV, 2007 WL 172105, at *1 (Tex. App.-Tyler Jan. 24,
2007, no pet.) (mem. op.)
96. In re R.M.R., 218 S.W.3d 863, 864 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2007, no pet.).
97. In re A.H.L., III, 214 S.W.3d 45, 54 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2006, pet. denied).
98. In re D.A.R., 201 S.W.3d 229, 230-31 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).
99. In re R.M., No. 04-07-00048-CV, 2007 WL 1988149, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio July 11, 2007, pet. denied).
100. 239 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2007, no pet.).
[Vol. 61
Parent and Child
scope of our review to the record of the hearing held under Family Code
[section] 263.405(d) [the determination of whether an appeal would be
frivolous], as clearly contemplated by the legislature, deprives the parent
of due process, particularly when new counsel has been appointed since
trial."101
The court disagreed that a reporter's record from the termination trial
was required. 102 Rather, it was sufficient to consider the record from the
post-judgment hearing at which the Department's attorney "described
evidence [from the trial] that would support its alleged grounds for termi-
nation. '1 0 3 The father, however, did not identify at the hearing "evidence
from the trial that would arguably support an argument that the jury
could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction as to the
truth of the allegations.' 0 4 Based on counsel's summaries from the hear-
ing, due process did not require the father to receive a free record of the
termination trial.' 05
Justice Gaultney dissented, noting the court should follow the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals' opinion in In re M.R.J.M.10 6 and order a record
of the entire trial.10 7 In Justice Gaultney's opinion, the court of appeals
could not "determine whether a factual sufficiency issue is frivolous with-
out reviewing the evidence. '10 8 He also questioned whether appellate
counsel could "adequately challenge a frivolous finding on a factual suffi-
ciency issue without access to a reporter's record."' 0 9 According to the
dissenting opinion, to assume a factual sufficiency challenge is frivolous
based on counsel's summaries of the evidence at a post-trial hearing "car-
ries an unacceptable risk when the evidence is disputed." 110
Although outside the Survey period, the Waco Court of Appeals re-
cently followed the Fort Worth Court of Appeals and concluded an indi-
gent father who raised legal and factual sufficiency claims was entitled to
a full record of the termination trial for the court of appeals to use in
reviewing the trial court's determination that any appeal would be
frivolous.1 1" '
101. Id. at 392.




106. 193 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (en banc).
107. A.S., 239 S.W.3d at 393-94.
108. Id. at 394.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. In re S.T., 242 S.W.3d 923, 924-25 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, no pet.) (published
order) (per curiam). Chief Justice Gray dissented from a November 28, 2007, order in the
same case because he disagreed the appellate court had jurisdiction. In re S.T., 239 S.W.3d
452 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, no pet.) (published order) (per curiam). He noted, however,
a full record of the trial was necessary because, at the frivolousness hearing, the trial court
took judicial notice of the evidence at trial. Id. at 464. Chief Justice Gray concluded the
summary procedure used in A.H. was the procedure that seems to have been contemplated
by the Legislature. Id. at 464-65.
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B. AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY
In In re M.A.,1 1 2 the trial court entered an order terminating the
mother's parental rights on July 14, 2006. Therefore, the mother's notice
of appeal was due on August 3, 2006. The mother filed the notice of
appeal on August 15, 2006, within fifteen days of when it was due, and the
notice was deemed timely by the Houston Fourteenth District Court of
Appeals.1 1 3 The mother filed an affidavit of indigency on September 14,
2006.
The Houston Court of Appeals noted Texas Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 20.1(c)(1) required the affidavit of indigency to be filed in the trial
court with or before the notice of appeal. 114 The deadline can be ex-
tended if, within fifteen days after the deadline, the party files a motion
under rule 10.5(b) in the appellate court. 115 Accordingly, even with an
extension, the latest date the mother could have filed the affidavit of indi-
gency was September 4, 2006.
The court noted the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Higgins v. Ran-
dall County Sheriffs Office' 16 "appears to allow an affidavit of indigency
to be filed much later."'117 However, unlike Higgins, M.A. "involve[d] the
termination of parental rights and the mandatory deadlines of section
263.405 of the Texas Family Code." 1 8 Under section 263.405(e), if the
trial court does not rule on a claim of indigency before the thirty-sixth
day after the final order is signed, the appellant is considered indigent.11 9
The Higgins rule, therefore, did not apply because:
an affidavit of indigence filed more than thirty-six days after the final
order is signed would either (1) entitle the appellant to indigent sta-
tus because it would be too late for the trial court to deny the claim,
or (2) require the trial court, and consequently the court of appeals,
to ignore the statutory deadline. Both scenarios violate the rules of
statutory construction by rendering meaningless either Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 20.1 or section 263.405 of the Texas Family
Code. Consistent with traditional statutory construction principles,
the more specific statute, section 263.405 of the Texas Family Code,
should control over the more general Rule 20.1, as interpreted by the
112. 222 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (per curiam).
113. Id. at 670 (citing Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997)).
114. Id.
115. Id.; see TEX. R. App. P. 20.1(c)(3).
116. 193 S.W.3d 898 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). In Higgins, the appellant filed a notice of
appeal without a filing fee or an affidavit of indigency. Four months later the court of
appeals notified the appellant the appeal would be dismissed if a filing fee was not paid
within ten days. Nine days later, the appellant filed an affidavit of indigency. The court of
appeals dismissed the appeal because the affidavit was untimely and was not accompanied
by a motion to extend time. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, noting the affidavit was
"no longer a jurisdictional requirement" and the court of appeals was required to allow the
appellant a reasonable time to correct the defect. Id. at 899.
117. M.A., 222 S.W.3d at 671 (noting affidavit of indigency filed in Higgins 133 days
after the notice of appeal).
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405(e) (Vernon Supp. 2007)).
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Texas Supreme Court in Higgins.
120
Further, allowing the Higgins rule to extend the time for filing an affida-
vit of indigency "would frustrate the Legislature's intent in enacting those
deadlines to reduce post-judgment delays" in termination cases.1 21 Ac-
cordingly, the Higgins rule does not apply to extend the time for filing an
affidavit of indigency in the appeal of a termination order.
1 22
C. GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
1. Incarceration
Section 161.001(1)(Q)(ii) of the Family Code provides parental rights
can be terminated if the parent is incarcerated or confined and is unable
to care for the child for at least two years from the date the termination
petition is filed.123 In In re H.R.M.,124 the mother and the stepfather of
the child sought to terminate the rights of the father under section
161.001(1)(Q)(ii). The jury found the father's parental rights should be
terminated. However, the court of appeals reversed, concluding the evi-
dence was factually insufficient to support a finding the father would still
be imprisoned on July 6, 2006, two years from the date the petition was
filed.
The Texas Supreme Court recognized "a two-year sentence does not
automatically meet subsection Q's two-year imprisonment require-
ment. 1 25 Often, "neither the length of the sentence nor the projected
release date is dispositive of when the parent will in fact be released from
prison. 1 26 Therefore, "evidence of the availability of parole is relevant
to determine whether the parent will be released within two years.
1' 27
But, because parole decisions are "inherently speculative," evidence re-
lating to the possibility of parole "does not prevent a factfinder from
forming a firm conviction or belief that the parent will remain incarcer-
ated for at least two years. ' 128 Otherwise, parental rights could be termi-
nated under 160.001(1)(Q)(ii) only when there was no possibility of
parole.129 This outcome would "impermissibly elevate the burden of
proof from clear and convincing to beyond a reasonable doubt.
1 30
The supreme court determined the court of appeals misapplied the
standard for reviewing factual sufficiency in parental termination cases.
131




123. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(Q)(ii) (Vernon 2008)
124. 209 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).
125. Id. at 108.
126. Id.






and that he was participating in a pre-release program available to in-
mates within two years of parole, "the jury was free to disregard [this]
testimony, which was barely more than conjecture."' 132 The court of ap-
peals failed to weigh all the evidence and based its decision on the fa-
ther's testimony that he had a possibility of parole. 133 In doing so, the
court of appeals merely substituted its judgment for that of the jury. 34
The father also argued he provided care for the child by leaving her
with her mother. The supreme court concluded "[a]bsent evidence that
the non-incarcerated parent agreed to care for the child on behalf of the
incarcerated parent, merely leaving a child with a non-incarcerated par-
ent does not constitute the ability to provide care.' 135 Otherwise, as long
as one parent was not incarcerated and was willing to care for the child,
the incarcerated parent's parental rights could never be terminated under
section 160.001(1)(Q)(ii). 136
2. Failure to Support
Section 161.001(1)(F) of the Family Code provides for the termination
of parental rights if a parent has failed to support the child in accordance
with the parent's ability during a period of one year ending within six
months of the date of the filing of the petition to terminate. 137 In 1993,
the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that in In re R.R.F.,138 (1) a
"child support order includes within it an implicit finding that the obligor
has the means to pay the amount ordered," and (2) the "inability to pay
support under a valid order is an affirmative defense that must be raised
by the party defending the allegation of failure to pay." In In re
D.S.P.,139 the Corpus Christi court revisited R.R.F., noting that although
R.R.F. had been both criticized and utilized approvingly, the criticism
"largely stems from our analogy between a termination proceeding and a
contempt proceeding for failure to pay child support.' a40
The court concluded there were significant differences between con-
tempt and termination proceedings. In a contempt proceeding, the obli-
gee must prove child support was due and not paid.14a The obligor may
plead the "affirmative defense of inability to provide support, which the
obligor then has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. ' 142 In contrast, section 161.001 of the Family Code does not in-




135. Id. at 110.
136. Id.
137. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(F) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
138. 846 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied), overruled by In
re D.S.P., 210 S.W.3d 776, 781 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.).
139. 210 S.W.3d 776, 780 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.).
140. Id.




accordance with ability as an element of termination, and requires each
finding needed for termination to be based on clear and convincing evi-
dence.1 4 3 Further, the consequences of a termination are permanent, but
a finding of contempt can be purged by payment of the owed child
support. 14
4
Accordingly, the court determined it erred in R.R.F. by concluding the
inability to pay support under a valid order is an affirmative defense that
must be raised and proved by the obligor. 145 The court recognized a
"child support order does contain an implied finding that the obligor has
the ability to pay the support.1 46 However, this "matter should not be
afforded any relevance in a termination proceeding involving section
161.001(F)" because:
[r]equiring a parent at risk of losing her parental rights to present
evidence of her inability to pay for the purpose of either (1) asserting
an affirmative defense or (2) overcoming a child support order's im-
plied finding of ability to pay, wrongfully shifts the burden of proving
ability to pay to the parent and excuses the movant in the termina-
tion proceeding from the burden of proving that the parent failed to
support in accordance with the parent's ability.
147
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals then overruled R.R.F.
148
VI. JURISDICTION
A. HOME STATE OF CHILD
Section 152.201(a) of the Family Code provides that a Texas court may
make an initial custody determination regarding a child if (1) the child's
home state is Texas, (2) the child's home state was Texas within six
months prior to the commencement of the proceeding if the child is ab-
sent from Texas but a parent continues to live in the state, (3) the child
has no home state or a court of the child's home state declined to exercise
jurisdiction over the child because Texas is the more appropriate forum,
(4) all courts potentially having jurisdiction over the child declined to ex-
ercise it because Texas is the more appropriate forum, or (5) no court of
any other state would have jurisdiction over the child.1 49 A child's "home
state" is the state in which the child lived with a parent or person acting
as a parent for at least six months immediately before commencement of
the child custody proceeding.1 50 However, even if Texas is not the child's
home state, a Texas court may exercise jurisdiction over a child if the






148. Id. The El Paso Court of Appeals has since agreed with the reasoning in of D.S.P.
in In re E.M.E., 234 S.W.3d 71, 74 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2007, no pet.).




to protect a child subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or
abuse.151
In In re J.C.B.,152 the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether
the trial court had jurisdiction to order the termination of parental rights.
On October 4, 2004, the child, who was approximately sixteen months old
and his parents were driving through Texas from Oklahoma when the
parents were arrested for possessing drugs. 153 The Department took cus-
tody of the child and immediately filed a petition for conservatorship and
termination of the parents' parental rights. On November 1, 2004, the
Department was appointed the child's managing conservator. The trial
court subsequently granted the termination and the mother appealed.
The Amarillo Court of Appeals noted that when the Department took
control of the child, neither the child nor his parents were residents of
Texas. Further, it was undisputed Oklahoma was the child's home state
and no Oklahoma court declined to exercise its jurisdiction over the
child. Therefore, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the child,
absent the emergency exception.1 54
The child was only sixteen months old at the time of his parents' arrest
and was unable to care for himself. There were also no friends or rela-
tives available to take the child. Accordingly, while the parents' arrest
was not "abandonment of [the child] in a technical sense, the child, no
doubt, was faced with impending mistreatment or abuse if left alone. '155
Therefore, the trial court had temporary jurisdiction over the child to se-
cure his welfare.15 6
The child remained in the managing conservatorship of the Depart-
ment from November 1, 2004, until the termination trial in February
2006. The court of appeals recognized the definition of "home state" in-
cludes a "residency requirement for a particular period before suit is com-
menced."'1 57 However, a custody determination entered pursuant to the
court's emergency jurisdiction becomes final if, "among other things, the
child's home state becomes Texas once the order is entered." 158
Therefore:
the concept of "home state" differs when jurisdiction is invoked
under [the emergency exception] and omits the requirement that the
six months of residence occur before the proceeding is commenced.
If this were not so, then there could be no home state for purposes of
finalizing orders rendered via emergency jurisdiction since the pro-
ceeding began before the child had resided with a parent or parent
surrogate in Texas for six months. 59
151. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.204(a).
152. 209 S.W.3d 821 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.).
153. Id. at 823.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 824.
156. Id.





During the fourteen months the child was in the Department's care,
the child's home state became Texas. 160 The trial court, therefore, had
jurisdiction over the termination.161
B. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT
In Monk v. Pomberg,162 the Houston First Court of Appeals considered
the intersection of the Family Code and the Texas Declaratory Judgments
Act ("DJA"). 163 In Monk, the mother and the child moved to Iowa in
2002. In November 2003, the father sought to modify conservatorship of
the child. The trial court declined jurisdiction because it found Texas was
an inconvenient forum for the litigation, Iowa was the child's home state,
and neither the child nor the mother had a significant connection with
Texas. 164
In January 2004, the father filed for bankruptcy. In May 2004, the
mother filed for termination of the father's parental rights in Iowa, alleg-
ing the father failed to pay court-ordered child support. The mother dis-
missed the petition due to concerns it violated the stay entered by the
bankruptcy court and asked the bankruptcy court to lift the stay so she
could pursue the termination of the father's parental rights. In July 2004,
the bankruptcy court lifted the stay to permit the mother to "commence
an action in the court that entered the divorce decree for that court to
hear [the mother's] petition to seek termination of the parent-child rela-
tionship, or for that court to refer the matter to another forum after it
conducted a hearing."'165
The mother filed suit for declaratory relief in the trial court, requesting
the court declare the child's home state was Iowa, her petition to termi-
nate the father's parental rights would not be properly commenced in
Texas, and Iowa was the proper jurisdiction and forum to hear the termi-
nation petition. The trial court granted the requested relief, declined ju-
risdiction, and deferred jurisdiction to Iowa.166 The father appealed,
arguing the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter
the declaratory judgment and the mother did not have standing to pursue
a declaratory judgment.
A Texas court with jurisdiction to make a child custody determination
may, at any time, decline to exercise its jurisdiction if it determines it is an
inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another
160. Id. at 824.
161. Id.
162. No. 01-05-00429-CV, 2007 WL 926491 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 29,
2007, no pet.).
163. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004 (Vernon 2008). The Legislature
amended section 37.004 during the 2007 session. Because the amendment did not substan-
tively affect the analysis in Monk, we will, for convenience, cite to the current version of
the statute.
164. Monk, 2007 WL 926491, at *1.




state is a more appropriate forum.167 The issue of an inconvenient forum
"may be raised upon motion of a party, the court's own motion, or re-
quest of another court. ' 168 The father claimed the mother's petition for
declaratory judgment did not meet the statutory requirements.
The court of appeals agreed, concluding the order of the bankruptcy
court "did not request or require [the mother] or the trial court to seek
another forum, but rather left it up to [the mother] whether to seek ter-
mination of [the father's] parental right in the [trial court] or in another
forum. ' 169 Accordingly, the mother failed to comply with section
152.207's procedural requirements. 170 The question, therefore, was
whether the mother could "pursue declaratory judgment to raise the issue
of inconvenient forum under section 152.207 of the Family Code" or was
required to proceed under section 152.207.171 The Houston court con-
cluded the DJA may be used to determine a party's rights under a statute,
municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise. 172 Construing the statute lib-
erally, the court determined the DJA "allows [the mother] to have the
trial court declare her rights, status and other legal relations under sec-
tion 152.207."173
VII. CHILD SUPPORT
The Texas Legislature made a number of statutory changes during the
2007 session that affect child support. First, the statutory cap of $6,000 on
net resources used when calculating child support has been increased to
$7,500.174 This change effectively increased the amount of child support a
high-earning parent must pay. Further, the cap now automatically adjusts
every six years, based on the consumer price index, to reflect inflation.175
The Legislature also modified the credit an obligor receives for paying
for a child's health insurance. 176 Historically, the obligor received a de-
duction from net resources used to calculate monthly child support for
the total cost of health insurance for the obligor's child who was the sub-
ject of the child support order-even if other children were part of the
cost of the insurance. In 2007, the Legislature adjusted the credit to re-
flect that more than one child could be covered on the same insurance
policy. The credit is now the cost of insuring the children divided by the
number of children covered.177
The Family Code also now provides a child support obligation acceler-
ates if the obligor dies, with the remaining balance of child support and
167. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.207(a) (Vernon 2002).
168. Id.
169. Monk, 2007 WL 926491, at *4.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at *5.
173. Id.






costs of health insurance, calculated through the month the child turns
eighteen, becoming payable on the date of the obligor's death. 178 The
trial court must calculate the present value of the unpaid child support
and determine whether any benefits the child is receiving-such as insur-
ance proceeds, trust distributions, or Social Security benefits-satisfy the
child support obligation. 179 If not, the obligee may collect from the obli-
gor's estate.180 The trial court may also order an obligor to purchase life
insurance sufficient to satisfy the child support obligation in the event of
the obligor's death. 18 1
The Legislature also addressed the "redirection" of child support pay-
ment in cases where the obligee has voluntarily relinquished possession
of the child; been incarcerated or sentenced to be incarcerated for at least
ninety days; or relinquished primary possession of the child in a proceed-
ing under the Juvenile Justice Code or under chapter 262 of the Family
Code (dealing with removal of the child by a governmental agency).
1 82
On motion of a party or the person having physical possession of the
child, the trial court is required to modify a child support order to redi-
rect the child support to the person having possession of the child for at
least six months. 183
VIII. CONSERVATORSHIP
A. EXTENDED POSSESSION
In In re C.A.P., Jr.184 the trial court named the mother and the father
joint managing conservators of their two children. Approximately five
years later, the mother filed a motion to modify, seeking to confirm child
support arrearages, clarify health care obligations, increase the amount of
child support, and enter wage withholding. The trial court granted the
motion.
Two months later, the father filed a motion to modify, seeking ex-
tended possession of the children under section 153.317 of the Family
Code. 185 Section 153.317 gives a possessory conservator the right to ex-
tended possession of a child if the child is enrolled in school and the pos-
sessory conservator elects for the extended possession "before or at the
time of the rendition of the original or modification order. 1 86 The
mother objected to the father's motion, arguing the father failed to timely
request extended possession under section 153.317 because he did not
request it before or at the time of the hearing on the mother's motion to
178. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.015 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.016(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
182. § 156.409.
183. Id.
184. 233 S.W.3d 896 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).
185. Id. at 898.
186. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.317 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
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modify. The trial court dismissed the father's motion to modify, and the
father appealed.
In an issue of first impression, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether a possessory conservator has an independent right to seek
extended possession under section 153.317. The father argued sections
153.001 (setting out the public policy of Texas is for both parents to be
involved with the children), 8 7 153.002 (providing the best interest of the
child is the primary consideration of the court in determining issues of
conservatorship and possession of and access to a child), 88 153.251 (stat-
ing provisions of standard possession is intended to guide courts as to the
minimum possession for a joint managing conservator and that it is the
public policy of Texas to encourage frequent contact between a child and
each parent), 8 9 and 153.252 (establishing a rebuttable presumption that
the standard possession order provides reasonable minimum possession
for a parent named a possessory or joint managing conservator and is in
the best interest of the child) 190 of the family code took precedence over
section 153.317 in situations where it is in the best interest of the child to
extend visitation. 19
Although it noted that section 153.317 appears to conflict with sections
153.002 and 153.252, the court of appeals, applying principles of statutory
construction, concluded these provisions could be harmonized to give ef-
fect to all sections.' 92 Because all sections are contained within the same
chapter of the family code, section 153.317 is "governed by the 'general
provisions' that clearly state that the public policies and best interest stan-
dards are to be paramount.' 9 3
Section 153.317 provides that the possessory conservator must request
extended possession either before or at the time of rendition of the origi-
nal or modification order.194 Accordingly, the court of appeals was re-
quired to "assume that the exclusion of the time period after the rendition
of the original or modification order was intentional on the part of the
legislature.' 1 95 In limiting the application of section 153.317 to requests
made before or at the time of rendition of the original or a subsequent
modification order, the legislature "ensured that the best interest of the
child would be considered by the court when granting requests for ex-
tended possession under section 153.317 because the court is already con-
sidering the best interest of the child at possession and modification
hearings."'1 96 Therefore, there is no independent right under section





191. C.A.P., Jr., 233 S.W.3d at 901.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 902.
194. Id.
195. Id. (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 312.002 (Vernon 2005)).
196. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002 (Vernon Supp. 2007)).
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conservator "fails to ask for extended visitation under section 153.317 un-
til after the modification order is issued, then the request is untimely by
virtue of the statute itself.'
97
B. STATUTORY PRESUMPTION
Section 153.131 of the Family Code establishes a rebuttable presump-
tion that the appointment of the parents of a child as joint managing con-
servators is in the best interest of the child.198 In Gardner v. Gardner,
199
the wife had three children. The husband was the biological father of one
of the children and the adoptive father of another of the children. He
was neither the adoptive nor the biological father of the third child. Af-
ter the wife filed for divorce, the parties entered into a mediated settle-
ment agreement addressing a number of issues including joint managing
conservatorship of all three children, the wife's right to establish the pri-
mary residence of the child the husband had adopted, and visitation
terms.200 After trial, the trial court named the husband and wife joint
managing conservators of all three children in accordance with the settle-
ment agreement, but gave the father the right to establish the primary
residence of two of the children. The wife appealed, contending the evi-
dence was insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption that a par-
ent should have custody of a child and, therefore, the trial court erred in
giving the husband the right to determine the primary residence of the
child for whom the husband was neither the natural nor the adoptive
father.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals determined that, pursuant to the
statutory presumption, "if a non-parent and a parent both seek managing
conservatorship of a child, a court may not appoint the non-parent as
managing conservator unless the non-parent submits sufficient proof that
the appointment of the parent would not be in the best interest of the
child."'20 1 But because the wife agreed to joint managing conservatorship
of all three children, the only issue before the trial court was which joint
managing conservator should be awarded the right to determine the pri-
mary residence of the two children. 20 2 Accordingly, the statutory pre-
sumption did not apply.
20 3
197. Id. The court noted that, pursuant to section 156.101 of the family code, a posses-
sory conservator may generally seek a modification when (1) the circumstances of the child
or party affected by the order have materially and substantially changed; (2) the child is at
least twelve years old and wishes to change the child's primary residence; or (3) the conser-
vator who has the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child has volun-
tarily relinquished the primary case and possession of the child to another person for at
least six months. Id. at 902-03 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.101 (Vernon Supp.
2006)).
198. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(b) (Vernon 2002).
199. 229 S.W.3d 747 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.).
200. Id. at 750.





The court recognized that the El Paso Court of Appeals had deter-
mined in In re De La Pena20 4 that the presumption applied not only to
determination of conservatorship but also to which conservator would
have the right to determine the child's primary residence. 20 5 However,
courts are required to interpret statutes according to their plain meaning,
and section 153.131 "clearly states the presumption applies only to deter-
minations of conservatorship. '20 6 The San Antonio Court of Appeals
concluded it "would have to rewrite the statute in order to reach" the
same result as the El Paso court.20 7
C. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
During the 2007 session, the Texas Legislature made several changes
regarding conservatorship of a child. Recognizing the importance of elec-
tronic communication, the legislature allowed a trial court to order com-
munication between a child and a conservator through electronic means
such as the Internet or videoconferencing. 20 8 The electronic communica-
tion supplements a conservator's periods of possession, but does not sub-
stitute for physical possession of the child where appropriate. When
ordering electronic communication, the court considers if the communi-
cation is in the best interest of the child and if the necessary equipment is
reasonably available. 20 9
The Legislature also amended the Family Code to address some impor-
tant issues for military families. The definition of "military deployment"
is no longer restricted to military assignments outside the United
States.210 Rather, "military deployment" is military duty for a period of
more than six months during which the person ordered to serve is not
provided the option of being accompanied by the child and is serving in a
location where access to the child is not reasonably possible.2 11 A posses-
sory conservator who does not have the exclusive right to determine the
primary residence of the child and who is subject to military deployment
may designate a person to exercise the possessory conservator's existing
periods of possession of the child.2 12 If the trial court determines it is in
the child's best interest, the person designated by the possessory conser-
vator will have the right to possession of the child while the possessory
conservator is deployed. 213 The Legislature also established the military
deployment of a conservator without the exclusive right to determine the
primary residence of the child is a material and substantial change of cir-
204. 999 S.W.2d 521, 534-35 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.).
205. Gardner, 229 S.W.3d at 752 (citing De La Pena, 999 S.W.2d at 534-35).
206. Id.
207. Id.








cumstances sufficient to justify a modification of an existing custody
order.214
IX. CONCLUSION
The law governing parent-child relationships remains fluid due to the
need to base decisions on the best interest of the child. However, during
the Survey period, the Texas Legislature addressed some unsettled, or
inequitable, areas of the law through amendments and additions to the
code. The appellate courts, using principles of statutory construction and
strict readings of the statutory language of the family code, also provided
greater clarity to some unsettled issues. But, as the cases demonstrate,
strict compliance with the Family Code is necessary for a party to avoid
losing valuable rights or compelling arguments.
214. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.105(b) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
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